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Abstract
We report on our experience on multidimensional aspects of our faculty’s network design
and management, including some unique aspects such as campus-wide VLANs and ghost-
ing, security and monitoring, switching and routing, and others. We outline a historical
perspective on certain research, design, and development decisions and discuss the network
topology, its scalability, and management in detail; the services our network provides, and
its evolution. We overview the security aspects of the management as well as data manage-
ment and automation and the use of the data by other members of the IT group in the faculty.
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1 Introduction
We present a number of the aspects we designed in the network infrastructure at the Faculty of
Engineering and Computer Science (ENCS), Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
The experience report covers about 10 years of design, development, deployment, and change
management 2001–2010. We first very briefly touch on some historical notes necessitating the
presented design and its evolution. Then we highlight the key problems and motivation in
Section 1.2 and proposed solutions to those problems in Section 1.3.
1.1 Brief historical notes
We are reporting on the evolution of a functioning network as it grew through ad hoc responses
to problems over more than ten years, not on a careful design of a freshly implemented net-
work. When the IT personnel under various departments such as CSE, ECE, MIE, BCEE, etc.
were merged under the umbrella of the Faculty of ENCS, the smaller departmental networks
and their management infrastructure had to be streamlined. These mergers saw the network
grow approximately 4-fold (this represents about 1/3 of the entire University’s network). New
policies, management strategies, security considerations, reliability, and scalability had to be
addressed, especially, since, at the time of the merger the networks were spanning more than 10
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geographically distributed buildings. The present network is comprised of approximately 4800
network clients that include desktops, servers, and other networked devices.
1.2 Problems and challenges
As we report on an evolutionary process, with motivation for change sometimes being political
(as in the case of integrating multiple departments), sometimes technical (as in the case of
needing to run multiple simultaneous ghosting sessions without disturbing the global network),
and sometimes managerial (as in the case of our need for a network database to track locations
of equipment in near-real time). As a result, several key issues emerged:
• Security.
• Scalability and management.
• Accretion of multiple departments with different setups.
• Trusted subnets (analyst-managed) and untrusted subnets (user-managed).
• Ghosting (OS image cloning).
• Cooperation with other IT subgroups.
• Connectivity and reliability.
1.3 Proposed solutions
The solutions deployed to address the challenges are summarised here:
• Campus-wide VLANs. The novelty in our design in here included, which nobody else to
our knowledge had ghosting VLANs capable of “imitating” the global network in multicast
sessions without adversely affecting normal operations.
• Extensive scripting and database support for management and monitoring.
• Spanning tree setup.
• Development of a set of audited tools and shells to allow sister group to access the data
and perform simple networking tasks.
• Extensive internal and external firewall design.
1.4 Organisation
What follows are some details on the solutions, best practices, new challenges and future work.
In Section 2.3 the ideas and their realization are described behind the notion of campus-wide
VLANs. In Section 5 we describe security aspects of the network design and our conserva-
tive approach which allows for more flexibility. In Section 2 are some switchfarm deployment
details, whose configuration allows for spanning tree to function. In Section 3 are the design
considerations of our routing setup taking into consideration the security and campus-wide-
VLAN aspects. In Section 4 we describe the type of services we provide with our network to our
faculty’s community. We provide some concluding remarks and statistical summary in Section 7.
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2 Switching
We describe some our switching topology and configuration details to highlight key points of
interest.
2.1 Configuration
We maintain a common central switch configuration profile, which is used when deploying a
new switch. In that profile, we typically configure the DNS settings, switch logging, and NTP
hosts (for automation and monitoring of switch logs). Standard procedures are in place for
switch additions, removals, moves, etc. as far as the configuration is concerned, and allowing
the spanning tree protocol to function properly.
2.2 Spanning tree protocol
Following the mathematical notion of spanning tree (connected undirected graph), the corre-
sponding switching protocol [20, 38, 8] (STP) is fully implemented in our network that covers
pretty much the entire switch farm. We have a single spanning tree covering all our switches,
that facilitates failover as well as redundancy. The main point of the protocol is to have con-
nectivity coverage to all the leaf nodes without creating an accidental loop directly or indirectly
“shortcircuiting” any two or more switch ports followed by the shutdown of the tree. To keep
it simpler, we don’t have a mesh of switches, but we make the extensive use of port channels
to maintain redundancy and most of our VLANs are trunked on all switches. Tree structure of
a connected element is a triangle (with one “corner” “broken”, so it is still an acyclic graph).
One of the “access” switches in the triangle is connected to another to form a pair via a gigabit
port (via GBICs), and other ports of the corresponding switches go to the core stack described
below with one of the ports configured to be in blocking mode to prevent looping. Breaking any
of the links would not result in a loss of connectivity as the redundant path would be followed.
Two major buildings have a stack of Cisco Catalyst 3750 switches. The main one, is the
9-element stack of BigSwitch1, is now arranged in a ring (see Figure 1). Elements in the upper
1 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6
| |
3 -- 5 -- 7 8
\ |
\ |
9
Figure 1: Ring connectivity in the main core stack of 3750s
row are powered by one UPS, and elements in the lower row (and 9) are powered by another. We
have taken care to connect all the spanning-tree-paired switches to corresponding port numbers
on vertically matched stack elements; e.g., a switch A11 (1/0/15) (stack element 1, port 15) is
connected to another switch A12 (3/0/15), and a switch A13 (2/0/9) is connected to another
A14 (5/0/9). That way, even if we lose a UPS in Room A, we still have full switch connectivity.
To elaborate, an access switch A11 in wiring closet Wc1 is connected through one of its gigabit
ports, say, to stack element 1, port 15; its other gigabit port is connected to its “closet-mate”
A12, which is itself connected to stack element 3, port 15, thus forming a three point loop for the
4
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spanning tree protocol to handle. In normal operation, spanning tree will very quickly decide to
block the direct connection between A11 and A12, sending all traffic through the core stack. If
either uplink to the core stack is lost, or if one of the stack elements 1 or 3 is lost, spanning tree
will quickly unblock the A11−A12 link, reestablishing full connectivity. If one of the UPSes in
the network operations center should fail, Figure 1 shows that only one of the stack elements
1 and 3 will be lost, and once again, spanning tree will quickly unblock the A11 − A12 link,
reestablishing full connectivity.
When connecting a non-switch device such as a server, we leave its “paired port” empty,
but we preconfigure it so that the device’s cable can just be moved to the paired port. For
the partnerless switches we give double uplinks to both paired ports. Switch #9 is a spare. If
switch #n fails, #9 can be reconfigured to take over from it. The schematic of the described
connectivity is illustrated in Figure 2 (current configuration) where BigSwitch1 and BigSwitch2
comprise the “Central stack A” and “B”.
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Figure 2: Network leading up to 2010
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Figure 3: Planned major core network changes to upgrade
2.3 Campus-wide VLANs
We diverge from the classical Cisco network setup [10], where the backbone of the network
consists of the core switches connected to distribution and access switches per floor with access
switches for individual end nodes (computers, etc.). This would inhibit our current design’s
ability to setup any computer on any VLAN anywhere on campus instantly. This is where our
innovation comes in. When we look at the standard Cisco network setup, we could see that our
configuration draws some similarities. These similarities can be seen if we look at the upstream
provider for our network’s connectivity as the core network. Then, our core BigSwitch1 and
BigSwitch2 switch stacks (that correspond to the knots in Figure 10) as well as the smaller
gigabit switches act as distribution switches, and the spanning-tree-paired switches would play
the role of the access switches.
Initially, we have not implemented Layer 3 connectivity on our switchfarm opting instead
to have the routing and firewalling along with NATing performed by a redundant set of Linux
boxes (one in each building via the core fibre-interconnected switches, see Figure 2). This
design was chosen because of constraints imposed by the ghosting requirement (“ghosting” as
in cloning desktop operating systems’ images using the Symantec’s Ghost software that allows
multicast distribution of the disk images to multiple clients simultaneously) as well as the need
for geographically dispersed VLANs for faculty members.
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2.3.1 Multiple ghosting sessions.
The Desktop group for some duration of time was performing 10 simultaneous ghosting sessions
across ≈ 1100 analyst-managed computers primarily spread across two buildings (earlier there
were more buildings to cover before the Faculty got consolidated). A single person was able
to ghost a floor of ≈ 300 computers at a time. The entire ghosting season would last 3-5
days to cover the majority of the lab computers. The ghost image sizes varied for 10GB for a
Linux partition and about 20GB for a Windows partition. To accomplish such a feat without
significant interruption of the network service to the rest of the regular users during the ghosting
season the Desktop group required a network service that could support all this. One way to
do this was allocating a VLAN per Desktop group member, where each Desktop member also
has their own ghosting server – two ghosting servers did not play well together in the same
VLAN – as well as a ghost router, which is a copy of one of our main router pairs along with
the DHCP server copy to work in the ghost VLANs. In order to ghost any arbitrary number
of computers normally residing in their respective VLANs and potentially across buildings, a
Desktop group member would move the switch ports of all those machines (via the scripting and
shell services we implemented in-house, see Section 6.2) to their own ghosting VLAN in batch,
and can do the entire ghosting session of this arbitrary set of machines without disruption to
the main networking services anywhere else in the Faculty.
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This could only be possible with campus-wide VLANs trunked on all switches and not a
traditional Cisco-world setup [10, 9].
2.3.2 Custom VLANs for faculty members.
To secure and seclude research groups or individual Faculty members for the computers they
purchase for them, their students and affiliates to do the research, share files, etc. they are
usually allocated a VLAN and a subnet of a required size depending on their needs. This
isolates them from potential attacks from other groups and subnets while permitting network
printing and file sharing they need. It also happens in some cases some professors or research
groups span their presence across buildings as well necessitating the VLANs being available
anywhere on the campus at any point in time.
3 Routing
This report covers essentially the modus operandi between circa 2001 to 2010, where all our
switchfarm was Layer-2 only. The routing, as a result, has been performed on pairs of redundant
Linux boxes geographically spread across buildings, and is comprised of an internal pair (among
our own subnetworks) and an external pair (the edge to the outside). The routers impose the
firewall rules designed for different purposes (see Section 5.1). The routing supports all the
required virtual interfaces for the VLANs present on the network and the maintenance of the
routing tables.
Connection tracking. The routers employ connection tracking for failover between buildings
without loss of sessions where the corresponding tables are saved and reloaded from one end
(primary) to another (secondary) in case of a failure of the primary or reboot of the primary,
automatically.
4 Services
Our network design, besides providing the usual “access to the Internet” is geared towards ser-
vices for the students, Faculty and staff. There are all kinds of specialised needs for printing,
filer sharing, servers, research equipment and groups including research graphics cluster, as well
as other research clusters in parallel computing, software security, service-oriented architec-
tures, language engineering, networking research, database engineering, genomics, audio-visual,
pattern recognition, and others.
The services to our own IT subgroups are provided in the form of the network database data
IT staff require for their daily activities. The data are provided via access tools (see Section 6.2),
which enable IT staff to perform a restricted set of networking tasks in order to improve our
scalability as an IT group.
AL. A now historical service to support authenticated laptop (AL) connections by the users
with a valid account in the Faculty and a dynamic IP within a range set aside for AL. AL
was an important service to our clientele. While it has significant security considerations, as
nearly any our service does, but AL is a service more than a security problem. Most of the
switch ports were configured with dot1x, so potentially any unused patched jack would be in
the AL state so a potential user could use it to authenticate themselves to be allowed to connect
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further. At the present, AL replaced by the allocation of static IP addresses on our network to
the users that make a proper request and are not using wireless connections. The replacement
was necessitated by the decision of the parent IT unit to abandon the use of proprietary software
for Windows platforms since that platform does not have a native implementation of two-factor
802.1X authentication built-in at the time of this writing, and the proprietary software licensing
terms became unbearable. While the AL service could still support Linux and MacOS X clients,
their number, while increasing, is still small comparative to the Windows clients.
5 Security
In the AITS group, IT security spans aspects covering several subgroups besides networking,
including system administration, desktop operations, faculty information systems, and user
services. Our responsibly is to ensure a sane and secure networking environment to the entire
Faculty and guard the integrity and availability of our backbone core and the leaf nodes [2, 3,
15, 24].
This covers the network bandwidth monitoring, health of the switch farm, routing equip-
ment, and rogue DHCP servers monitoring as well as desktop monitoring for infections and
vulnerabilities (with quarantine), potential violations by MAC spoofing attacks, port scanning,
illegal peer-to-peer activities, and equipment moves.
5.1 Firewalls
We employ two pairs of redundant firewalls across two buildings implemented using iptables in
Scientific Linux environment [23, 21, 33] that provide a number of internal and external services,
routing, NATing, logging and monitoring. Both firewalls total in more than 1000 rules. Both
firewalls employ conservative deny-all policy and allow only required services.
Why Scientific Linux and iptables? While any Linux distribution would be fine, we tradi-
tionally used RedHat derivatives such as RHEL, Fedora, and now Scientific Linux as it is a
widely deployed and entreprise level operating system. The primary justification for iptables
(aside from the cost and being one of the most widely deployed industry standard firewalls) is
that iptables allows unrestricted branching of the rule “tree”, something that’s important to
the task of securely managing traffic amongst more than 150 subnets offering different services
and presenting widely varying security problems. Cisco ACLs e.g. are simply not up to the task.
Additionally, when we started, Cisco ASA didn’t exist, but ipchains (precursor of iptables)
did. Moreover, cost was an issue. A “layer 2” Cisco network with “layer 3” handled by com-
modity hardware and free and open-source software was at the same time much cheaper and
more flexible than any available alternative.
The internal firewall provides or denies access to or from our IT’s core servers managed
by the system administration group and desktop groups to allow printing, connectivity to the
NetApp filers, web applications and the like. Misbehaving hosts are also placed in quarantine on
the internal firewall (e.g. in Figure 5 what we configure to place on quarantine and the resulting
iptables rules are in Figure 6 compiled with a make [30] marking at pre-routing with a special
token; and anything marked with that token at the forward chain is only allowed accessing
permitted patch and antivirus sites).
The external firewall deals with the connectivity to and from outside of our administrative
domain allowing certain incoming connections such as web, ssh, remote desktop, licensing,
and printing services from the University’s wireless, and the like to an authorised list of hosts.
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...
# admnusr 2010-11-03 XXX.XXX.XXX.134 8 OS[Windows 5.1] MS06-040 VULNERABLE
sickhost.domain
...
Figure 5: Typical quarantine entry
Chain PREROUTING (policy ACCEPT)
target prot opt source destination
MARK all -- sickhost.domain anywhere MARK set 0x2
...
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT)
target prot opt source destination
qrntine all -- anywhere anywhere MARK match 0x2
...
Chain qrntine (1 references)
target prot opt source destination
ACCEPT all -- anywhere XXX.XXX.XXX.0/24
ACCEPT all -- anywhere anywhere
ACCEPT tcp -- anywhere antivirus-site1.domain tcp dpt:1234
ACCEPT tcp -- anywhere antivirus-site1.domain tcp dpt:1234
patchSites all -- anywhere anywhere
REJECT tcp -- anywhere anywhere reject-with tcp-reset
REJECT all -- anywhere anywhere reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
Figure 6: Typical quarantine set of firewall rules
Offending phishing and other external sites are blocked at this firewall. NATing from the private
space as well as bandwidth restriction enforcement take place here as well.
The list of blocked internal machines and external sites are provided via a web page to the
rest of IT staff, primarily the service desk to help to deal with phishing attacks and the related
inquiries.
The rules are processed from a source script by a bash script in order to prepare an
iptables-restore loadable file that pre-resolves the DNS entries to speed up processing and
deter errors as well as loads the rulesets automically to avoid race conditions, etc. – in an
approach that was similarly presented in [27].
5.2 Switch port violations
We also monitor switch port violations (swpvios). Most of the ports are configured to be bound to
a fixed number of known MAC addresses (usually one). When users attempt to move computers
around or plug-in an unknown piece of networked equipment into a registered jack we received
an alert and are notified of its location. Ports were bound to MAC addresses in order to prevent
students or passers-by from unplugging our computers and plugging in their own. Not doing this
would be a failure waiting to happen (see on MAC address spoofing detection in Section 5.3).
A sample of a common switch port configuration in teaching and research labs is in Figure 7.
We used to shutdown ports automatically, requiring a manual intervention to bring them
back up by an analyst as a proactive way to shut out rogue clients, but it became evident fast
enough that this induced a significant manual intervention overhead as most frequent violations
were people moving their computers from one desk to another, or someone connecting their
laptop from jack to jack in a room until they realised it’s not going to work. The switch ports
are configured to restrict. The users do not get the network service until they talk to us
or to the service desk to notify of the fact that the equipment has moved or new equipment
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was purchased and requires networking. Switching ports to protect does silence the repeated
alerts without granting the network service until the computer is moved back to its original
jack or we are notified to authorise the move. It’s worth noting protect has appeared with
a particular release of IOS, and prior to that shutdown was the only option (needless to say
the scale of manual intervention overhead required to bring the ports back up). Additionally,
while restrict is a useful macro, it has a side effect of complicating debugging when machines
move by necessitating port clear-ups from “sticky” MAC addresses. In the end, the user services
staff have been granted access to that feature via a shell to clear up ports, etc. to address the
management scalability problem.
interface FastEthernet0/40
description [Auto] machine.domain
switchport access vlan XYZ
switchport mode access
switchport port-security
switchport port-security violation restrict
switchport port-security mac-address sticky
switchport port-security mac-address sticky XXXX.XXXX.XXXX
spanning-tree portfast
end
Figure 7: Typical port configuration for computers in labs
It is also worth mentioning the specific use of spanning-tree portfast in light of the
discussion in Section 2.2. This option is used to speed up the (re)computation of the spanning
tree helping the overall network performance and nearly guaranteeing no loops [8].
5.3 MAC spoofing monitoring
MAC spoofing monitoring is a serious task to watch out for about 1000 Faculty-managed com-
puters in teaching and general purpose labs where physical presence even with a fleet of service
desk personnel is not always possible. Any student or visitor alike can unplug a network cable
from the wire and plug it into their laptop having previously observed the MAC address of the
analyst-managed computer by logging to it first and then altering own’s MAC address of the
laptop by a tool or a virtual environment such as VirtualBox, VMWare, Parallels or the like.
The desktops are expected to talk to us in a certain way and the switch log has a sequence of
link up/down events when the jack is unplugged and plugged back in that triggers the alert. We
had 3-5 incidents that we caught by the monitoring. There are a few false positive cases usually
caused by ghosting at times or slow system startup. There is usually no swpvio, as the MAC
address is changed in advance on the offending laptop.
5.4 Network bandwidth abuse
We use Argus [22, 2] to monitor and audit aggregate statistics about our hosts on the network
on the routers. One of the scripts from the scriptfarm (see Section 6.2) reports regularly via a
cron job the top exporters and importers of the data to and from the outside. Since we know
who/what those hosts are from our RP records in the database (see Section 6.1), we can follow
up then with the person via a ticketing system. In some cases exceptions are permitted to known
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educational and patch sites alike (see Figure 8) or some research group’s industrial partners. All
other connections are “choked” to a limit to repay the bandwidth used (e.g. in Figure 9).
# Note: Ordered by netblock size for efficiency
17.0.0.0/8 Apple Computer
65.52.0.0/14 Microsoft
204.70.0.0/15 SAVVIS
131.107.0.0/16 Microsoft
207.46.0.0/16 Microsoft
64.4.0.0/18 Microsoft
207.68.128.0/18 Microsoft
80.231.19.64/27 Microsoft
198.6.32.0/19 Symantec
207.68.192.0/20 Microsoft
66.187.224.0/20 Red Hat
209.87.208.0/20 Zone Labs (zonealarm)
209.132.176.0/20 Red Hat
192.92.94.0/24 Symantec
216.10.192.0/24 Symantec
216.34.181.0/24 SourceForge
206.167.78.0/26 Akamai RISQ
213.86.172.128/27 Sophos
...
Figure 8: Typical patch sites
Chain PREROUTING (policy ACCEPT)
target prot opt source destination
choke00044 all -- anywhere internal.host1.domain
choke00045 all -- anywhere internal.host2.domain
...
Chain POSTROUTING (policy ACCEPT)
target prot opt source destination
chokeOutsides all -- video.domain/19 anywhere
chokeOutsides all -- warez.domain/19 anywhere
...
Chain choke00044 (1 references)
target prot opt source destination
ACCEPT all -- anywhere anywhere limit: avg 20/sec burst 20
DROP all -- anywhere anywhere
Chain choke00045 (1 references)
target prot opt source destination
ACCEPT all -- anywhere anywhere limit: avg 20/sec burst 20
DROP all -- anywhere anywhere
Chain chokeOutsides (28 references)
target prot opt source destination
ACCEPT all -- anywhere anywhere limit: avg 100/sec burst 100
DROP all -- anywhere anywhere
Figure 9: Typical choking rules
5.5 Nessus, Snort, and infection monitoring
Nessus, Snort are typical tools [34, 28, 23, 2] we maintain at and run in our environment on
all our clients. Critical problems are reported to the RPs and any quarantine or blocking
are instituted as necessary at the firewalls. We also monitor for infections, behaviour of port
scanning, attempts to use outside DNS servers other than ours, and the like, to which we respond
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and follow up by a variety of means.
6 Management
Managing a network such as ours requires some knowledge of the corresponding TCP/IP pro-
tocols [14], DNS [1], SNMP [29, 17] and the corresponding Linux networking [25] to be able
to write our tools that talk to switches, DNS, ARP, and others in accordance with the best
practices [16, 32].
Scalability is an issue. During the course of the network’s evolution, we went from a few
hundred computers and terminals running at 10 Mbps to a few thousand at 100 Mbps, and a
few dozen at 1 Gbps. At present, downtime is approximately 30 seconds per month (excepting
individual switch failures) for monthly maintenance. Delegating some network management
responsibilities to the service desk and desktop group alleviates the burden via custom build
scripts. We employed OSS tools that help us with that as well and are in the process of
adopting Netdisco [18] with its web-based management console for the task to improve on that
end further. Our overall topological perspective view of the switchfarm is illustrated in Figure 10
from Netdisco. The labels are intentionally obscured. We use MRTG [19, 17] as our graphing
tool to visualise the traffic flows on switch ports.
6.1 Database
We designed our relatively large database using a PostgreSQL 8.x [37] setup to record the
information of our switches, ports, patches, patch panels, jacks, rooms, room occupants, RP
records for hosts, user-managed and analyst-managed, and the relationships between all those
entities amounting at present to about 80 relations (tables, views, triggers, constraints). (See
e.g. Figure 11). Some of the information is maintained by scripts, such as what is connected
where and last seen on a switch or an ARP table, list of VLANs from the VTP master, and the
like. The responsible person (RP) data are maintained manually as well as when new switches
are deployed or relocated and new jacks, patches, and ports are added. A number of views (the
largely single rectangles on the image) and interface scripts exists that allow the networking
group and sister groups to query some of the data to perform their job, specifically by the
service desk and the desktop groups for location awareness and default services, among others.
6.2 Scripting and automation
We have developed and continue developing, maintaining, refactoring what we call our scriptfarm
for the management of the switchfarm, firewalls, the database, the switch logs, etc. The scripts
also provide shells to other analysts in sister groups to access the network data and in some
cases change it for us to scale. The majority of the scripts are written in Perl primarily for its
powerful regular expressions [12], set of libraries for network and database programming [31],
system administration [6] and for using Perl modules and objects [26]. For some scripting we
reply on Python [7], in particular for our Snort customizations, as well as shell scripts in tcsh
and bash.
We maintain an SCM repository (CVS [4]), and central Makefile-based [30] build and deploy
system, and the startup scripts we need to uniformly use on our managed servers. Upon commit-
ting the revisions to the CVS the rest of the members are notified. The updates are propagated
through the CVS as well to the server machines. The central consolidated repository for the
13
Multifaceted Faculty Network Design and Management Michael J. Assels et al.
Figure 10: Netdisco’s NetMap global switchfarm overview
all the numerous scripts in the scriptfarm significantly improves maintenance and accounting of
the scripts and code auditing, and overall design and development process.
The automation aspect comes around maintaining the database about the current state of
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Figure 11: High-level database structure overview
the network as well as maintenance of the description fields on the switch ports with a special
[Auto] token set to make them more usable and readable when viewing via MRTG [19] and
other views and shells. The automation of course covers security alerts to either mailing lists,
individuals, or the RT ticketing system if something noteworthy happens for us to take action.
Switch configuration backup is also part of the scriptfarm. We also build our startup init scripts,
typically launched from different run levels when the machine boots depending on which cron
job and other services are assigned to a particular machine at the boot time rather than to its
back up peer.
7 Conclusion
We serve four different buildings with a network segregated by VLANs. Our switching de-
sign uses the spanning tree protocol with redundancy. Likewise we have redundant routing and
firewalling geographically spread. We maintain a centralised DNS and DHCP. We support “mul-
ticast” ghosting (not true multicasting just yet, but rather broadcasting where the ghost data
are transferred to every trunk). We maintain in-house and employ external OSS management
software and a database that controls network data in a bidirectional manner. Various security
scripts in the scriptfarm alert of problems.
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Faced with IP address exhaustion we now have a motivational drive to move to IPv6. Manag-
ing excessive aggregate bandwidth is becoming a problem. Aging access layer and management
software is another issue we are facing. Some new challenges emerge when building reorganiza-
tions take place. By the nature of our work we will be collaborating with the other networking
groups beyond our faculty (e.g. access support for licensing, wireless, and others), whose topol-
ogy design is significantly different from ours driving us to simplify operations. We are also
dealing with issues regarding increasing service requests, virtualisation support, and maintain-
ing data quality in our database.
Based on our experience, the broad guideline that we arrive at is that it’s useful to think
about ways to let one’s network evolve over time rather than to redesign it from scratch whenever
new problems arise. Campus-wide VLANs implementation is of particular mention. We also
proposed ways of using old ideas and old solutions to existing and new problems. The rest can
be derived from our report and adapted accordingly if needed for various aspects presented.
7.1 Statistics
• 4 buildings served
• about 170 Catalyst 2950, 10 Catalyst 2960, 10 Catalyst 2970, 10 Catalyst 2924, 10 Catalyst
3550, 10 Catalyst 3548 switches
• about 65 wiring closets
• about 4800 clients
• about 5800 patched jacks
• about 200 VLANs
• about 60 scripts in the scriptfarm
• about 80 database relations (tables, views, triggers, etc.)
• about 730 firewall rules on the internal edge; 450 firewall rules on the external edge
• network group members ranged between 2 and 4 (presently) in charge of the network in
the Faculty.
7.2 Future work
As we are moving towards newer hardware and tools and overall design, we are documenting
the change and plan on reporting an updated experience report as a result. In summary, the
future work in various terms and durations will focus on:
1. Gradual switchover from old to new core switches (see Figure 4) and routers and a 10G
backbone eventually arriving at a topology shown in Figure 3.
2. IPv6 pilot project [5, 35, 11, 13] the first in the University.
3. Layers 2 and 3 switching / routing with eventual switchover of the internal router/firewall
to the Cisco Catalyst 4510 and Catalyst 3750X switches.
16
Multifaceted Faculty Network Design and Management Michael J. Assels et al.
4. Cisco ACLs to reduce/eliminate Linux internal routers’ iptables load. To achieve that our
ongoing preliminary plan is to simplify, consolidate, and eliminate some of the complexity
of the current ruleset before actually moving onto the ACLs.
5. Consolidate scripting with standardization and refactoring.
6. Cloud/mobility/ubiquity support of various networking equipment.
7. Network preparation for Active Directory (AD) service.
8. Explore the OpenNMS [36] for a variety of management tasks in addition to our existing
toolset.
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